Why is it so hard for the U.S. to win wars?
Why American Military Dominance Doesn't Guarantee Victory
Breaking Things vs. Building Peace
Why is it so hard - Peter Bergen, a CNN national security analyst and author of the recently published book All The Presidents' Wars, has identified a persistent pattern in American military engagements. According to Bergen, the United States excels at the initial phase of conflicts—destroying infrastructure and eliminating adversaries—but consistently struggles with the conclusion. "We generally do a pretty good job of the breaking things and killing people at the inception of the wars," Bergen observed, noting that this tendency extends across multiple decades of American involvement abroad.
The American approach to warfare reveals a fundamental disconnect between tactical success and strategic outcomes. Despite possessing unmatched military capabilities, the United States has failed to achieve lasting political transformation in its major conflicts. This observation forms the foundation of Bergen's analysis, which examines American military engagements spanning the last twenty-five years.
Three Conflicts, One Region
Over the past quarter-century, American forces have maintained continuous combat operations for more than two decades across three significant conflicts, all concentrated within a single geographic area. The sequence began with Afghanistan, progressed through Iraq, and now encompasses Iran. Each conflict followed a similar trajectory: rapid military intervention followed by prolonged uncertainty.
Presidents have consistently promised that superior American firepower would resolve these conflicts quickly. During the George W. Bush administration, military forces removed the Taliban from power in Afghanistan within weeks in 2001 and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq by 2003. More recently, under President Trump, American bombing operations—supported by Israeli forces—eliminated numerous Iranian leaders on the opening day of hostilities while maintaining sustained pressure on the country.
The Day After Problem
Despite these initial successes, the anticipated political transformations have not materialized. The Taliban currently govern Afghanistan. Iraq has achieved partial stability following extensive combat, yet continues facing numerous challenges. Iran's theocratic government persists despite military pressure, leaving the conflict unresolved.
"We, the United States, tend to not plan for the day after — the peace that follows the war," said Bergen.
This failure to prepare for post-conflict scenarios represents a recurring theme in American military history. The emphasis on overwhelming force often overshadows diplomatic considerations and long-term planning for reconstruction and governance.
An Imperial Appetite with a Tourist's Approach
Paul Salem, a Middle East analyst based in Lebanon and affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has characterized this contradiction in American foreign policy. "The U.S. has an imperial appetite, but a tourist's approach to it," Salem explained, suggesting that American expectations for quick, inexpensive resolutions clash with the realities of regional complexity.
"Their recent history is not one of stability and deep institutions that you can just come in and change somebody at the top and everything works out," said Salem.
Bergen echoes this assessment, describing American behavior as imperial in ambition but reluctant in commitment. "Empires typically require people to learn languages, stay there for a long time, not be there on just short tours," Bergen noted. "We don't do the kinds of things that would be necessary to hold on to territories for a long time. We're very reluctant to do it."
Maximalist Goals Without Ground Forces
President Trump has pledged to end what he calls "forever wars," yet his approach to Iran demonstrates the challenges of this commitment. The United States is confronting its most powerful regional adversary without deploying ground troops, a strategy that has limited American casualties compared to previous conflicts.
Douglas Lute, a retired Army lieutenant general who served as the so-called "war czar" coordinating operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan under Presidents Bush and Obama, supports avoiding ground forces but warns about unrealistic objectives. "When we launch only a bombing campaign but we retain maximalist goals, like regime change, you don't have any prospect for success unless you're just lucky," Lute stated. "And being lucky is not the place to start a military campaign."
"We've had repeated disconnects between ends, ways, and means. We've had a lack of sufficient understanding of what we were getting into," said Lute, who also served as the U.S. ambassador to NATO.
Trump has variously demanded the elimination of Iran's nuclear capabilities, the overthrow of its government, and the destruction of its military infrastructure. These ambitious targets mirror earlier conflicts where American objectives exceeded available resources.
The Local Defender's Advantage
Despite American technological superiority, regional adversaries have developed effective countermeasures. In Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgents utilized roadside bombs and suicide attacks to disrupt American operations. In Iran, military forces have deployed inexpensive drones and successfully constrained navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, even after American forces degraded Iran's conventional naval capabilities.
Harvard professor Stephen Walt captured this dynamic in his recent analysis for Foreign Policy. He argued that observers fascinated by American technological achievements—such as the F-35 fighter jet and combined arms operations—have overlooked a fundamental shift in warfare. "Those dazzled by the technological wizardry of an F-35 or the ability of the United States, Israel, and a few others to conduct complicated combined arms operations have failed to recognize that warfare has been slowly shifting in favor of local defenders, even when facing seemingly superior foes," Walt wrote.